A Formal Model of Checked C

Abstract—In this work, we present a formal model of Checked C, a dialect of C that aims to enforce spatial memory safety. Our model pays particular attention to the semantics of dynamically sized, potentially null-terminated arrays. We formalize this model in Coq, and prove that any spatial memory safety errors can be blamed on portions of the program labeled unchecked; this is a Checked C feature that supports incremental porting and backward compatibility. Our model develops an operational semantics that uses fat pointers to guarantee spatial safety. However, we formalize a compilation scheme that can yield thin pointers, with bounds information managed using inserted code. We show that the generated code faithfully simulates the original. Finally, we build an executable version of our model in PLT Redex, and use a custom random generator for well-typed and almost-well-typed terms to find inconsistencies between our model and the Clang Checked C implementation. We find this a useful way to co-develop a language (Checked C is still in development) and a core model of it.

I. INTRODUCTION

The C programming language remains extremely popular despite the emergence of new, modern languages. Unfortunately, C programs lack spatial memory safety, which has long made them susceptible to a host of devastating vulnerabilities, including buffer overflows and out-of-bounds reads/writes. Despite their long history, buffer overflows and other spatial safety violations are among the most prevalent and dangerous vulnerabilities on the Internet today [25].

Several industrial and research efforts—including CCured [18], Softbound [17], and ASAN [22]—have explored means to compile C programs to automatically enforce spatial safety. These approaches all impose performance overheads that are deemed too high for use in deployment. Recently, Microsoft introduced Checked C, an open-source extension to C with new types and annotations whose use can ensure a program’s spatial safety [4]. Importantly, Checked C supports development that is incremental and compositional. Code regions (e.g., functions or whole files) designated as checked are sure to enforce spatial safety, a property which is preserved via composition with other checked regions. But not all regions must be checked: Checked C’s annotated checked pointers are binary-compatible with legacy pointers, and may coexist in the same code, which permits a deliberate (and semi-automated) refactoring process. Parts of the FreeBSD kernel have been successfully ported to Checked C [3], and overall, performance overhead seems low enough for practical deployment.

While Checked C promises to enforce spatial safety, we might wonder whether its design and implementation deliver on this promise, or even what “spatial safety” means when a program contains both checked and unchecked code. In prior work, Ruef et al. [21] developed a core formalization of Checked C and with it proved that checked code cannot be blamed: any spatial safety violation can only be attributed to code that is not in a checked region. While their work is a good start, it fails to model important aspects of Checked C’s functionality, particularly those involving pointers to arrays. In this paper, we cover this gap, making three main contributions.

Dynamically bounded and null-terminated arrays. Our first contribution is a core formalism called CORECHKC, which extends Ruef et al. [21] with several new features, most notably dynamically bounded arrays (Section III). Dynamically bounded arrays are those whose size is known only at run time, as designated by in-scope variables using dependent types. A pointer’s accessible memory is bounded both above and below, to admit arbitrary pointer arithmetic.

We also model null-terminated arrays, whose upper bound defines the array’s minimum length—additional space is available up to a null terminator. For example, the Checked C type `nt_array_ptr<T> count(1)` says that `p` has length at least `n` (excluding the null terminator), but further capacity is present if `p[n]` is not null. Checked C (and CORECHKC) supports flow-sensitive bounds widening: statements of the form `if (p[n]) { /* code */ }`, where `p`’s type is `nt_array_ptr<T> count(0)`, typecheck statement `s` under the assumption that `p` has type `nt_array_ptr<T> count(1)`, i.e., one more than it was, since the character at the current-known length is non-null. Similarly, the call `n = strlen(p)` will widen `p`’s bounds to `n`. Subtyping permits treating null-terminated arrays as normal arrays of the same size (which does not include, and thereby protects, the null terminator).

We prove, in Coq, a blame theorem for CORECHKC. As far as we are aware, ours is the first formalized type system and proof of soundness for pointers to null-terminated arrays with expandable bounds.

Sound compilation of checked pointers. Our second contribution is a formalization of bounds-check insertion for array accesses (Section IV). Our operational semantics annotates each pointer with metadata that describes its bounds, and the assignment and dereference rules have premises to confirm the access is in bounds. An obvious compilation scheme (taken by Cyclone [7, 10], CCured [18], and earlier works) would be to translate annotated pointers to multi-word objects: one word for the pointer, and 1-2 words to describe its lower and upper bounds. Inserted checks references these bounds. While convenient, such “fat” pointers are expensive, and break backward binary compatibility with legacy pointers. We formalize Checked C’s compilation approach, which uses a single machine word for the pointer, and adds checks involving the declared bounds (e.g., in a dependent type) or additional stack-allocated ghost variables to accommodate bounds widening.
We show that the compiled program simulates the original by mechanizing CORECHKC and the compilation judgment in PLT Redex [6], and use its random testing feature to give confidence that simulation holds.

As far as we are aware, ours is the first formalism to cleanly separate bounds-checking compilation from the core semantics; prior work merged the two, conflating meaning with mechanism [2, 26]. In carrying out the formalization, we discovered that our compilation approach is more expressive than that proposed in the Checked C specification [23] (Section IV-B); we doubt we would have discovered this had we not separated it from the semantics.

Model-based randomized testing. Finally, our third contribution is a strategy and implementation of model-based randomized testing (Section V). To check the correctness of our formal model, we compare the behavior between the existing Clang Checked C implementation and our own model. This is done by a conversion tool that converts expressions from CORECHKC into actual Checked C code that can be compiled by the Clang Checked C compiler. We build a random generator of programs largely based on the typing rules of CORECHKC and make sure that, both statically and dynamically, CORECHKC and Clang Checked C are consistent after conversion. This helped rapidly prototype the model and uncovered several issues in the Checked C compiler.

We begin with a review of Checked C (Section II), present our main contributions, and conclude with a discussion of related and future work (Sections VI, VII).

II. CHECKED C OVERVIEW

This section describes Checked C, which extends C with new pointer types and annotations that ensure spatial safety. More details can be found in a prior overview [4] or the full specification [23]. Checked C is implemented as a fork of Clang/LLVM and is freely available.¹

A. Checked Pointer Types

Checked C introduces three varieties of checked pointer:

• **ptr<T>** types a pointer that is either null or points to a single object of type T.

• **array_ptr<T>** types a pointer that is either null or points to an array of T objects. The array width is defined by a bounds expression, discussed below.

• **nt_array_ptr<T>** is like array_ptr<T> except that the bounds expression defines the minimum array width—additional objects may be available past the upper bound, up to a null terminator.

A bounds expression used with the latter two pointer types has two forms:

• **count(e)** where e defines the array’s length. Thus, if pointer p has bounds count(n) then the accessible memory is in the range [p, p+n]. Bounds expression e must be side-effect free and may only refer to variables whose addresses are not taken, or adjacent struct fields.

• **bounds(e_l,e_h)** where e_l and e_h are pointers that bound the accessible region [e_l, e_h] (the expressions are similarly restricted). Bounds count(e) is shorthand for bounds(p, p+e). This most general form of bounds expression is useful for supporting pointer arithmetic.

The Checked C compiler will instrument loads and stores of checked pointers to confirm the pointer is non-null, and the access is within the specified bounds. For pointers p of type nt_array_ptr<T>, such a check could spuriously fail if the index is past p’s specified upper bound, but before the null terminator. To address this problem, Checked C supports bounds widening. If p has bounds expression bounds(e_l,e_h) a program may read from (but not write to) e_h; when the compiler notices that a non-null character is read at the upper bound, it will extend that bound to e_h + 1.

B. Example

Fig. 1 gives an example Checked C program.² The function parse_utf16_hex on lines 1-17 takes as its argument null-terminated pointer s from which it attempts to read four characters. These are interpreted as hex digits and converted to an uint returned via parameter result. At the outset, s has no specific bounds annotation, which we can interpret as count(0); this means that s[0] may be read on line 5.

```c
1 nt_array_ptr<null const char>
2 parse_utf16_hex(nt_array_ptr<const char> s,
3   ptr<uint> result) {  
4   int x1, x2, x3, x4;
5   if (s[0] != 0) { x1 = hex_char_to_int(s[0]);
6   if (s[1] != 0) { x2 = hex_char_to_int(s[1]);
7   if (s[2] != 0) { x3 = hex_char_to_int(s[2]);
8   if (s[3] != 0) { x4 = hex_char_to_int(s[3]);
9   if (x1 != -1 && x2 != -1 && x3 != -1 && x4 != -1) {
10     *result = (uint)((x1<<12)|(x2<<8)|(x3<<4)|x4);
11     return s+4;
12   }  
13   }  
14   void parse(nt_array_ptr<const char> s,
15     array_ptr<uint> p : count(n),
16     int n) {  
17     array_ptr<uint> q : bounds(p,p+n) = p;
18     int s & k q < p+n) {
19       array_ptr<uint> r : count(1) =
20         dyn_bounds_cast<array_ptr<uint>>(q,count(1));
21     s = parse_utf16_hex(s,r);
22     q++;
23   }
24  }  
25  
26  Fig. 1: Parsing a string of UTF16 hex characters in Checked C
```

¹https://github.com/Microsoft/checkedc-clang

²Ported from the Parson JSON parser, https://github.com/kgabis/parson
The true branch of the conditional (which extends all the way to the brace on line 15) is thus typechecked with a widened bound of count(1). Likewise, the conditionals on lines 6-8 each widen it one further; the widened pointer (a+4) is returned on success.

The parse function on lines 18-26 repeatedly invokes parse_utf16_hex with its parameter s, and fills out array p whose declared length is the parameter n. Writes happens via pointer q, which is updated using pointer arithmetic. We specify its bounds as bounds(p, p+n) to support this: even as q changes, its bounds variables p and n do not. Converting from an array_ptr< uint > to a ptr< uint >, done for the call on line 25, requires proving the array has size at least 1. This is true because of the loop condition q < p+n, which is q’s upper bound, but the compiler is not smart enough to figure this out. To convince it, we can manually insert a bounds check using dyn_bounds_cast.

While bounds checks are conceptually inserted on every array load and store, many of these are eliminated by LLVM. For example, all of the pointer accesses to s on lines 5-8 are proved safe at compile-time, so no bounds checks are inserted for them. Elliott et al. [4] reported average run-time overheads of 8.6% on a pointer-intensive benchmark suite (49.3% in one case); Duan et al. [3] measured no overhead at all on a port of FreeBSD’s UDP and IP stacks to Checked C.

C. Other features

Checked C has other features not modeled in this paper. Two in regular use are interop types, which ascribe checked pointer types to unported legacy code, notably in libraries; and generic types on both functions and structs, for type-safe polymorphism. More details about these can be found in the language specification.

D. Spatial Safety and Backward Compatibility

Checked C is backward compatible with legacy C in the sense that all legacy code will typecheck and compile. However, only code that appears in checked regions, which we call checked code, is spatially safe. Checked regions can be designated at the level of files, functions, or individual code blocks, the first with a #pragma and the latter two using the checked keyword.3 Within checked regions, both legacy pointers and certain unsafe idioms (e.g., variadic function calls) are disallowed. The code in Fig. 1 satisfies these conditions, and will typecheck in a checked region.

How should we think about code that contains both checked and legacy components? Ruef et al. [21] proved, for a simple formalization of Checked C, that checked code cannot be blamed: Any spatial safety violation owes to the execution of unchecked code. In this paper we extend that result to a richer formalization of Checked C.

III. Formalization

This section describes our formal model of Checked C, called CORECHKC, making precise its syntax, semantics, and type system, and developing its metatheory, including type soundness and the blame theorem.

A. Syntax

The syntax of CORECHKC is given by the expression-based language presented in Fig. 2.

There are two notions of type in CORECHKC. Types τ classify word-sized values including the integers and pointers, while types ω classify multi-word values such as arrays, null-terminated arrays, and single-word-size values. Pointer types (ptr^m ω) include a mode annotation (m) which is either checked (c) or unchecked (u) and a type (ω) denoting the type of value to which is pointed. Array types include both the type of elements (τ) and a bound (β) comprised of an upper and lower bound on the size of the array ((β1, β0)). Bounds b are limited to integer literals n and expressions x + n. Whether an array pointer is null terminated or not is determined by annotation κ, which is nt for null-terminated arrays, and otherwise (we elide the • when writing the type). Here is the corresponding CORECHKC syntax for these types:

```
array_ptr<τ> : count(n) ⇔ ptr^c [(0, n) τ]
nt_array_ptr<τ> : count(n) ⇔ ptr^c [(0, n) τ]nt
```

As a convention we write ptr^c [b τ] to mean ptr^c [(0, b) τ], so the above examples could be rewritten ptr^c [n τ] and ptr^c [n τ]nt, respectively.

CORECHKC expressions include literals (n : τ), variables (x), memory allocation (malloc(ω)), let binding (let x = e1 in e2), static and dynamic casts ((τ)e resp.), function calls (f(τ)), addition (e1 + e2), pointer dereference and assignment (*e and *e1 = e2, resp.), unchecked bounds (unchecked e), the strlen operation (strlen(x)), and conditionals if (e) e1 else e2.

Integer literals n are annotated with a type τ which can be either int, or ptr^m ω in the case n is being used as a heap address (this is useful for the semantics). The strlen expression operates on variables x rather than arbitrary expressions to simplify managing bounds information in the type system; the more general case can be encoded with a let. We use a less verbose syntax for dynamic bounds casts: e.g., the following dyn_bounds_cast<array_ptr<τ>>(e, count(n))

3You can also designate unchecked regions within checked ones.

Function names: f Variables: x Integers: n ::= Z
Mode: m ::= c | u
Bound: b ::= n | x + n β ::= (b, b)
Word Type: τ ::= int | ptr^m ω
Type Flag: κ ::= nt | •
Type: ω ::= τ | [β τ]κ
Expression: e ::= n:τ | x | malloc(ω) | let x = e in e |
| (τ)e | (τ)e | f(τ) | strlen(x) |
| e + e | *e | *e = e | unchecked e |
| if (e) e else e |

Fig. 2: CORECHKC Syntax
The computation relation can transition to undefined behavior. The mode function determines the mode of the evaluating expression based on the context \( E \): if the \( \square \) in \( E \) occurs in context unchecked \( E' \), the mode is \( u \); otherwise, it is \( c \). Evaluation contexts \( E \) define a standard left-to-right evaluation order. (We explain the \( \text{ret}(x, \mu, e) \) syntax shortly.)

Fig. 4 shows selected cases of the computation relation. We explain the rules in turn using the example of Fig. 5.

**Pointer accesses.** The rules for dereference and assignment operations—\( \text{S-DEF} \), \( \text{S-DEFNULL} \), \( \text{S-DEFNTARRAY} \), and \( \text{S-ASSIGNARR} \)—illustrate how the semantics checks bounds. Rule \( \text{S-DEFNULL} \) transitions attempted null-pointer dereferences to \( \text{null} \), whereas \( \text{S-DEF} \) dereferences a non-null (single) pointer.

\( \text{S-ASSIGNARR} \) assigns to an array as long as 0 (the point of dereference) is within bounds designated by the pointer’s annotation and strictly less than the upper bound. Note for the assignment rule, arrays are treated uniformly whether they are null-terminated or not (\( \kappa \) can be \( \cdot \) or \( \text{null} \))—the semantics does not search past the current position for a null terminator, for example. The program can widen the bounds as needed, if they currently precede the null terminator: \( \text{S-DEFNTARRAY} \), which dereferences an NT array pointer, allows an upper bound of 0, since the program may read, but not write, the null terminator. A separate rule (not shown) handles normal arrays.

**Casts.** Static casts of a literal \( n : \tau \) to a type \( \tau \) are handled by \( \text{S-CAST} \). In a type-correct program, such casts are confirmed safe by the type system. To evaluate a cast, the rule updates the type annotation on \( n \). Before doing so, it must “evaluate” any variables that occur in \( \tau \) according to their bindings in \( \varphi \). For example, if \( \tau \) was \( \text{ptr}\tau [[(0, x, 3)] \text{int}] \), then \( \varphi(\tau) \) would produce \( \text{ptr}\tau [[(0, 5)] \text{int}] \) if \( \varphi(x) = 2 \).

Dynamic casts are accounted for by \( \text{S-DYNCAST} \) and \( \text{S-DYNCASTBOUND} \). In a type-correct program, such casts are assumed correct by the type system, and later confirmed by the semantics. As such, a dynamic cast will cause a bounds failure if the cast-to type is incompatible with the type of the target pointer, as per the \( n_l' > n_l \lor n_h' > n_h \) condition in \( \text{S-DYNCASTBOUND} \). An example use of dynamic casts is given on line 7 in Fig. 5. The values of \( x \) and \( n \) might not be known statically, so the type system cannot confirm that \( x \leq n \); the dynamic cast assumes this inequality holds, but then checks it at run-time.

**Binding and Function Calls.** The semantics handles variable scopes using the special \( \text{ret} \) form. \( \text{S-LET} \) evaluates to a configuration whose stack is \( \varphi \) extended with a binding for \( x \), and whose expression is \( \text{ret}(x, \varphi(x), e) \) which remembers \( x \) was previously bound to \( \varphi(x) \); if it had no previous binding, \( \varphi(x) = \bot \). Evaluation proceeds on \( e \) until it becomes a literal \( n : \tau \), in which case \( \text{S-RET} \) restores the saved binding (or \( \bot \)) in the new stack, and evaluates to \( n : \tau \).
Function calls are handled by S-Fun. Recall that array bounds in types may refer to in-scope variables; e.g., parameter a’s bound count(n) refers to parameter n on lines 2-3 in Fig. 5. A call to function f causes f’s definition to be retrieved from Ξ, which maps function names to forms τ [τ/τ] e, where τ is the return type, (τ/τ) is the parameter list of variables and their types, and e is the function body. The call is expanded into a let which binds parameter variables Σ to the actual arguments Σ, but annotated with the parameter types Σ (this will be safe for type-correct programs). The function body e is wrapped in a static cast (τ[τ/τ]), which is the function’s return type but with any parameter variables Σ appearing in that type substituted with the call’s actual arguments Σ. To see why this is needed, suppose that strcat in Fig. 5 is defined to return a nt_array_ptr<int>:count(n) typed term, and assume that we perform a strcat function call as x = strcat(a, b, 10). After the evaluation of strcat, the function returns a value with type nt_array_ptr<int>:count(10) because we substitute bound variable n in the defined return type with 10 from the function call’s argument list.

Bounds Widening. Bounds widening occurs when branching on a dereference of a NT array pointer, or when performing strcat. The latter is most useful when assigned to a local variable so that subsequent code can use the result, e.g., e in let x = strcat(y) in e. Lines 4 and 5 in Fig. 5 are examples. The widened upper bound precipitated by strcat(y) is extended beyond the lifetime of x, as long as y is live. For example, x’s scope in line 4 is the whole function body in strcat because the lifetime of the pointer y is in the function body. This is different from the Checked C specification, which only allows bound widening to happen within the scope of x, and restoring old bound values once x dies. We allow widening to persist outside the scope at run-time as long as we are within the stack frame, and we show this does not necessarily require the use of fat pointers in Sec. IV.

Rule S-STRWIDEN implements strcat widening. The predicate ∀i.n ≤ i < n + na ⇒ (∃ni ti.H(n + i) = ni) aims to find a position n + na in the NT array that stores a null character, where no character as indexes between n and n + na contains one. (This rule handles the case when na > nh, the na ≤ nh case is handled by a normal strcat rule; see Appx. 12.)

Rule S-IFNTT performs bounds widening on x when the dereference *x is not at the null terminator, but the pointer’s upper bound is 0 (i.e., it’s at the end of its known range). x’s upper bound is incremented to 1, and this count persists as long as x is live. For example, a’s increment (lines 5–8) is live until the return of the function in Fig. 1; thus, line 11 is valid because a’s upper bound is properly extended.

Fig. 4: CORECHKC Computation Relation, Selected Rules
nt_array_ptr<int> strncat : count(0)
(nt_array_ptr<int> a : count(n),
 nt_array_ptr<int> b : count(0), int n) {
 int x = strlen(a);
 int y = strlen(b);
 if (x ≤ n)
 nt_array_ptr<int> c : count(n) =
 <nt_array_ptr<int>>(a,count(n));
 else return null;
 if (x+y ≤ n)
 for (int i = 0; i < y; ++i)
 * (c+x+i) = * (b+i);
 else return null;
 return a;
 }

nt_array_ptr<int> strlen : count(0)
(nt_array_ptr<int> a : count(n),
 nt_array_ptr<int> b : count(0), int n) {
 int x = 0;
 int y = strlen(b);
 while (* (a+x) ≠ '0' )
 a++; x++;
 for (int i = 0; i < y; ++i)
 if (i + x < n)
 * (a+i) = * (b+i);
 else return null;
 return a;
 }

Fig. 5: Implementations for strncat

C. Typing

We now turn to the CORECHK type system. The typing
judgment has the form Γ;Θ ⊢_m e : τ, which states that in
a type environment Γ (mapping variables to their types) and
predicate environment Θ (mapping integer-typed variables to
Boolean predicates), expression e will have type τ if evaluated
in mode m. Key rules for this judgment are given in Fig. 6.
In the rules, m ≤ m’ uses the two-point lattice with u ≤ c.
All remaining rules are given in Appx. A and D.

Pointers and Subtyping. Rules T-DEFARR and T-ASSIGNARR
typecheck array dereference and assignment operations resp.
returning the type of pointed-to objects; rules for pointers to
single objects are similar. The condition m ≤ m’ ensures
that checked pointers cannot be dereferenced in unchecked e
blocks; the type rule for unchecked e (not shown) sets m = u
when checking e. The rules do not attempt to reason whether
the access is in bounds; this check is deferred to the semantics.

Casting and Subtyping. Rule T-CAST rule forbids casting
to checked pointers when in checked regions (when m = c),
but τ is unrestricted when m = u. The T-CASTCHECKEDPTR
rule permits casting from an expression of type τ’ to a checked
pointer when τ’ ⊑ ptr<τ>τ. This subtyping relation ⊑ is given
in Fig. 7; the many rules ensure the relation is transitive. Most
of the rules handling casting between array pointer types; the
second rule 0 ≤ b_l ∧ b_h ≤ 1 ⇒ ptr<τ>τ ⊑ ptr<τ>τ [(b_l, b_h) τ]
permits treating a singleton pointer as an array pointer with
b_h ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ b_l.

Since bounds expressions may contain variables, determin-
ing assumptions like b_l ≤ b’_l requires reasoning about those
variables’ possible values. The type system uses Θ to make
such reasoning more precise.4 Θ is a map from variables x to
predicates P, which have the form P := T | ge_0. If Θ maps
x to T, that means that the variable can possibly be any value;
ge_0 means that x ≥ 0. We will see how Θ gets populated
and give a detailed example of subtyping below.5

Rule T-DYNCAST typechecks dynamic casting operations,
which apply to array pointer types only. The cast is accepted
by the type system, as its legality will be checked by the
semantics.

Bounds Widening. The bounds of NT array pointers may
be widened at conditionals, and due to calls to strlen. Rule
T-Ir handles normal branching operations; rule T-IfNT is
specialized to the case of branching on *x when x is a NT
array pointer whose upper bound is 0. In this case, true-branch
e_1 is checked with x’s type updated so that its upper bound
is incremented by 1; the else-branch e_2 is typechecked under
the existing assumptions. For both rules, the resulting type is the
join of the types of the two branches (according to subtyping).
This is important for the situation when x itself is part of the
result, since x will have different types in the two branches.

Rule T-STR handles the case for when strlen(y) does not
appear in a let binding. Rule T-LETSTR handles the case
when it does, and performs bounds widening. The result of
the call is stored in variable x, and the type of y is updated in
Γ when checking the let-body e to indicate that x is y’s
upper bound. Notice that the lower bound b_l is unaffected by
the call to strlen(y); this is sound because we know that
strlen will always return a result n such that n ≥ b_n, the
current view of x’s upper bound. The type rule tracks strlen’s
widened bounds within the scope of x, while the bound-
widening effect in the semantics applies to the lifetime of y.
Our type preservation theorem in Sec. III-D shows that our
type system is a sound model of the CORECHK semantics,
and we discuss how we guarantee that the behavior of our
compiler formalization and the semantics matches in Sec. IV.
This rule also extends Θ when checking e, adding a predic-
icate indicating that x ≥ 0. To see how this information is
used, consider this example. The return on line 16 of Fig. 5
has an implicit static cast from the returned expression to the
declared function type (see rule T-FUN, described below). In
type checking the strlen on line 4, we insert a predicate in
Θ showing n ≥ 0. The static cast on line 16 is valid according
to the last line in Fig. 7:

ptr<τ>τ [(0, n) τ]κ ⊑ ptr<τ>τ [(0, 0) τ]κ

because 0 ≤ 0 and 0 ≤ n, where the latter holds since Θ
proves n ≥ 0. Without Θ, we would need a dynamic cast.

4So, technically, the subtyping relation ⊑ and the bounds ordering relation
≤ are parameterized by Θ; this fact is implicit to avoid clutter.
5As it turns out, the subtyping relation is also parameterized by ϕ, which
is needed when type checking intermediate results to prove type preservation;
source programs would always have ϕ = 0. Details are in Appendix C.
T-Cast
\[ m = c \Rightarrow \tau \neq \text{ptr} \] for any \( \tau'' \)
\[ \Gamma ; \Theta \vdash_m e : \tau' \]
\[ \Gamma ; \Theta \vdash_m (\tau : \tau) : \tau \]

T-CastCheckedPtr
\[ \Gamma ; \Theta \vdash_m e : \tau' \quad \tau' \subseteq \text{ptr} \tau \]
\[ \Gamma ; \Theta \vdash_m (\text{ptr} \tau : \tau) : \text{ptr} \tau \]

T-DynCast
\[ \Gamma ; \Theta \vdash_m e : \text{ptr} \tau [\beta \tau] \]
\[ \Gamma ; \Theta \vdash_m (\text{ptr} \tau [\beta \tau] : \tau) : \text{ptr} \tau [\beta \tau] \]

T-Str
\[ \Gamma ; \Theta \vdash_m e : \text{ptr} m [\beta \tau] \]
\[ \Gamma ; \Theta \vdash_m \text{strlen}(e) : \text{int} \]

T-Let
\[ \Gamma ; \Theta \vdash_m e : \tau \]
\[ \Gamma ; \Theta \vdash_m e_1 : \tau_1 \]
\[ \Gamma ; \Theta \vdash_m e_2 : \tau_2 \]
\[ \Gamma ; \Theta \vdash_m \text{let} x = \text{strlen}(y) \text{ in } e : \tau \]

T-DefArr
\[ m \leq m' \]
\[ \Gamma ; \Theta \vdash_m e : \text{ptr} m' [\beta \tau] \]
\[ \Gamma ; \Theta \vdash_m *e : \tau \]

T-AssignArr
\[ \Gamma ; \Theta \vdash_m e_1 : \text{ptr} m' [\beta \tau] \]
\[ \Gamma ; \Theta \vdash_m e_2 : \tau \]
\[ \tau' \subseteq \tau \quad m' \leq m \]
\[ \Gamma ; \Theta \vdash_m e_1[e_2] : \tau \]

Fig. 6: Selected Type Rules

\[ \tau \subseteq \tau \]
\[ 0 \leq b_i \land b_i \leq 1 \Rightarrow \text{ptr} m \tau \]
\[ b_i \leq 0 \land b_i \leq b_i \Rightarrow \text{ptr} m [(b_i, b_i) \tau] \subseteq \text{ptr} m \tau \]
\[ b_i \leq 0 \land b_i \leq b_i \Rightarrow \text{ptr} m [(b_i, b_i) \tau] \subseteq \text{ptr} m \tau \]
\[ b_i \leq b_i \land b_i \leq b_i \Rightarrow \text{ptr} m [(b_i, b_i) \tau] \subseteq \text{ptr} m [(b_i, b_i) \tau] \]

Fig. 7: Subtyping Relation

In our formal presentation, \( \Theta \) is quite simple and is just meant to illustrate how static information can be used to avoid dynamic checks; it is easy to imagine richer environments of facts that can be leveraged by, say, an SMT solver as part of the subtyping check [20, 24].

Dependent Functions and Let Bindings. Rule T-FUN is the standard dependent function call rule. It looks up the definition of the function in the function environment \( \Xi \), typechecks the actual arguments \( \tau \) which have types \( \tau' \), and then confirms that each of these types is a subtype of the declared type of \( f \)'s corresponding parameter. Because functions have dependent types, we substitute each parameter \( e_i \) for its corresponding parameter \( x_i \) in both the parameter types and the return type. Consider the \text{strncpy} function in Fig. 5; its parameter type for \( a \) depends on \( n \). The T-FUN rule will substitute \( n \) with the argument at a call-site.

Rule T-LET types a \text{let} expression, which also admits type dependency. In particular, the result of evaluating a \text{let} may have a type that refers to one of its bound variables (e.g., if the result is a checked pointer with a variable-defined bound); if so, we must substitute away this variable once it goes out of scope. Note that we restrict the expression \( e_1 \) to syntactically match the structure of a Bounds expression \( b \) (see Fig. 2).

Rule T-RET types a \text{ret} expression, which does not appear in source programs but is introduced by the semantics when evaluating a let binding (rule S-LET in Fig. 4); this rule is needed for the preservation proof. After the evaluation of a let binding a variable \( x \) concludes, we need to restore any prior binding of \( x \), which is either \( \bot \) (meaning that there is no \( x \) originally) or some value \( n : \tau \).

D. Type Soundness and Blame

In this subsection, we focus on our main metatheoretic results about \text{CoreCHKC}: type soundness (progress and preservation) and blame. The type soundness theorems rely on a notion of heap and stack well-formedness:

Definition 1 (Heap Well-formedness): A heap \( \mathcal{H} \) is well-formed, iff (i) the null position \( 0 \) is not defined in \( \mathcal{H} \), and (ii) every type annotation in it contains no free variables.

Definition 2 (Stack Well-formedness): A stack snapshot \( \varphi \) is well-formed, iff every type annotation in it contains no free variables.

Moreover, as a program evaluates its expression may contain literals \( n : \tau \) where \( \tau \) is a pointer type, i.e., \( n \) is an index in \( \mathcal{H} \) (perhaps because \( n \) was chosen by \text{malloc}). The normal typechecking judgment for \( n \) is implicitly parameterized by \( \mathcal{H} \), and the rules for typechecking literals confirm that pointed-to heap cells are compatible with (subtypes of) the pointer’s type annotation; in turn this check may precipitate checking the type consistency of the heap itself. We follow the same approach as Ruef et al. [21], and show the rules in Appendix A.

Progress now states that terms that don’t reduce are either values or their mode is unchecked:

Theorem 1 (Type Progress Theorem): For any Checked C program \( e \) and heap \( \mathcal{H} \), if \( e \) and \( \mathcal{H} \) are well-formed, and
metadata without loss of expressiveness. A compiler can insert code to manage and check bounds on metadata. Components may be erased: using static information.

\[ \emptyset; \emptyset \vdash_{m} e : \tau, \text{ then } e \text{ is either a value } (n : \tau), \text{ unchecked } (m = u), \text{ or there exists } \varphi' H' e', \text{ such that } (\emptyset, H, e) \rightarrow_{m} (\varphi', H', e'). \]

**Proof:** By induction on the typing derivation.

For preservation, we also need to introduce a notion of consistency, relating heap environments before and after a reduction step, and type environments, predicate sets, and stack snapshots together.

**Definition 3 (Type-Stack Consistency):** A type environment \( \Gamma \), variable predicate set \( \Theta \), and stack snapshot \( \varphi \) are consistent, iff every variable defined in \( \Theta \) is defined in \( \Gamma \), and for every variable \( x, \Gamma(x) = \tau \) implies that \( \varphi(x) \) is defined and there exists \( n \) and \( \tau' \), such that \( \varphi(x) = n : \tau' \) and \( \tau' \subseteq \tau \).

**Definition 4 (Heap Consistency):** A heap \( H' \) is consistent with \( H \), iff every address defined in \( H \) is defined in \( H' \).

Armed with the definitions of consistency, we can now prove preservation, which states that a reduction step preserves both the type of the expression being reduced, as well as well-formedness and consistency of environments:

**Theorem 2 (Type Preservation Theorem):** For any Checked C program \( e \), heap \( H \), stack \( \varphi \), type environment \( \Gamma \), variable predicate set \( \Theta \), and a type \( \tau \), that are all are well-formed, if \( \Gamma, \Theta, \varphi \) are consistent, \( e \) is well typed \( \Gamma; \Theta; \varphi \vdash_{c} e : \tau \), and if there exists \( \varphi' \), \( H' \) and \( e' \), such that \( (\varphi, H, e) \rightarrow_{c} (\varphi', H', e') \), then there exists \( \Gamma', \Theta' \) and \( \tau' \), such that \( \Gamma', \Theta', \varphi', H' \) and \( e' \) are well-formed, \( \Gamma', \Theta' \) and \( \varphi' \) are consistent, \( H' \) is consistent with \( H \), \( \Gamma'; \Theta' \vdash_{c} e : \tau' \), and \( \tau' \subseteq \tau \).

**Proof:** By induction on the typing derivation.

Using type soundness we can prove our main result, blame, which states that if there is any spatial memory safety violation is triggered, it must necessarily come from the unchecked region.

**Theorem 3:** [The Blame Theorem] For any Checked C program \( e \), heap \( H \), type \( \tau \), if \( H \) and \( e \) are well-formed, \( \emptyset; \emptyset \vdash_{c} e : \tau \), and if there exists \( \varphi' \), \( H' \), a failure result \( r \), and \( m \), such that \( (\varphi, H, e) \rightarrow_{m}^{*} (\varphi', H', r) \), then there exist \( E \) and \( e_{a} \), such that \( e' = E[e_{a}] \), and \( \text{mode}(E) = u \).

**Proof:** By induction on the number of steps of the Checked C evaluation \( \rightarrow_{m}^{*} \), using progress and preservation to maintain the invariance of the assumptions.

These proofs have been carried out in a Coq development.

**IV. Compilation**

The semantics of CORECHK uses annotations on pointer literals in order to keep track of array bounds information, which is checked at dereferences and changed during widening. However, in the real implementation of Checked C, these annotations are not present—pointers are represented as a single machine word with no extra metadata. We show how the annotations can be safely erased: using static information a compiler can insert code to manage and check bounds metadata without loss of expressiveness.

This section sketches our compilation algorithm that converts from CORECHK to COREC, an untyped language without metadata annotations. Compilation is defined by extending CORECHK’s typing judgment thusly:

\[ \Gamma; \Theta; \rho \vdash_{m} e \gg e : \tau \]

There is now a COREC output \( e \) and an input \( \rho \), which maps each nt_array_ptr variable \( p \) to a pair of ghost variables that keep \( p \)'s up-to-date upper and lower bounds; these may differ from the bounds in \( p \)'s type due to bounds widening.\(^6\)

When \( \Gamma, \Theta \) and \( \rho \) are all empty, we write \( e \gg e \) rather than the complete judgment, implicitly assuming that \( e \) is a well-typed and closed term.

We formalize rules for this judgment in PLT Redex [6], following and extending our Coq development for CORECHK.

To give confidence that compilation is correct, we use Redex’s property-based random testing support to show that compiled-to \( e \) simulates \( e \), for all \( e \).

**A. Approach**

Due to space constraints, we explain the rules for compilation by example; the complete rules are given in Appendix F. Each rule performs up to three tasks: (a) conversion of \( e \) to A-normal form; (b) insertion of dynamic checks; and (c) insertion of bounds widening expressions. A-normal form conversion is straightforward: compound expressions are handled by storing results of subexpressions into temporary variables, as in the following example.

\[
y = (x + 1) + (6 + 1); \quad \text{a} = x + 1; \quad \text{b} = 6 + 1; \quad \text{y} = \text{a} + \text{b};
\]

This simplifies the management of effects from subexpressions. The next two steps of compilation are more interesting.

During compilation, \( \Gamma \) tracks the lower and upper bound associated with every pointer variable according to its type. At each declaration of a nt_array_ptr variable \( p \), the compiler allocates two ghost variables, stored in \( p(p) \); these are initialized to \( p \)'s declared bounds and will be updated during bounds widening.\(^7\) Fig. 8 shows how an invocation of strlen on a null-terminated string is compiled into C code. Each dereference of a checked pointer requires a null check (See S-DEFNULL in Fig. 4), which the compiler makes explicit: Line 3 of the generated code has the null check on pointer \( p \); and similar checks happen at line 8 and line 11. Dereferences also require bounds checks: line 2 checks \( p \) is in bounds before computing strlen(p), while line 10 does likewise before computing \( \ast(p + 1) \).

For strlen(p) and conditionals if(*p), the CORECHK semantics allows the upper bound of \( p \) to be extended. The compiler explicitly inserts statements to do so on \( p \)'s ghost bound variables. For example, Fig. 8 line 6 widens \( p \)'s upper bound if strlen’s result is larger than the existing bound.

---

\(^6\)Since lower bounds are never widened, the lower-bound ghost variable is unnecessary; we include it for uniformity.

\(^7\)Ghost variables are not used for array_ptr types (the bounds expressions are) since they are not subject to bounds widening.
/* nt_array_ptr<int> p : count(p,p) */
/* ρ(p) = p_lo,p_hi */
{
    int x = strlen(p);
    if (x > 1) putchar(*p+1);
}

Fig. 8: Compilation Example for Check Insertions

int deref_array (int n, nt_array_ptr<int> p : bounds(p, p+n)) {
    /* ρ(p) = p_lo,p_hi */
    if (*p) return *(p+1);
    return 0;
}

... // nt_array_ptr<int> p0 : bounds(p0, p0+n)

deref_array(5, p0);

int deref_array(int n, int *p) {
    int *p_lo = p;
    int *p_hi = p + n;
    /* runtime checks */
    assert(p_lo <= p && p <= p_hi);
    assert(p != NULL);
    int p_derefed = *p;
    if (p_derefed != '0') {
        /* widening */
        if (p_hi == p) {
            ++p_hi;
        }
    }
    int *p0 = p + 1;
    assert(p_lo <= p0 && p0 <= p_hi);
    assert(p0 != NULL);
    return *p0;
}

return 0;
...
//int *p0, set_bounds(p0) = p_lo, p_hi
deref_array(5, p0);

Fig. 9: Compilation Example for Dependent Functions

Lines 7–12 of the generated code in Fig. 9 show how bounds are widened when compiling expression if(*p). If we find that the current p address is equal to the upper bound (line 10), and p’s content is not null (line 8), we then increase the upper bound by 1 (line 11). Fig. 9 also shows a dependent function call. Notice that the bounds for the array pointer p are not passed as arguments. Instead, they are initialized according to p’s type—see line 3 of the original CORECHKC program at the top of the figure. Line 2 of the generated code sets the lower bound to p and line 3 sets the upper bound to p+n.

B. Comparison with Checked C Specification

The use of ghost variables for bounds widening is a key novelty of our compilation approach, and adds more precision to bounds checking at runtime compared to the official specification and current implementation of Checked C [23, 5.1.2, pg 85]. For example, the strncpy example of Fig. 5 compiles with the current Clang Checked C compiler but will fail with a runtime error. The statement int x = strlen(a) at line 4 changes the upper bound of a to x, which can be smaller than n, the capacity of the array pointer a. The assignment at line 14 will always fail if the index x + i is checked against the statically determined upper bound x. This forces us to inline the definition of strlen as in strncpy_c to avoid runtime errors when running code compiled with the Clang Checked C compiler. Likewise, if we were to add another dereference to p after line 6 in the original code at the top of Fig. 8, the Clang Checked C compiler would check p against its original bounds (p, p) since the updated upper bound p+x cannot be retained with x out of the scope. In the presence of ghost variables, these bounds have been widened by the assignment in line 5 (assuming the null-terminator was not the first element of the string) and remain available in the entire stack frame, and therefore the check will succeed. In contrast, in the actual implementation of Checked C, the scope of the widening is limited to the scope of the conditional at both runtime and compile time, which means that the inserted dynamic check would fail. To make it match the specification, our compilation definition could rely only on the type-based bounds expressions available in Γ for checking, and eschew ghost variables. However, doing so would force us to weaken the simulation theorem, reduce expressiveness, and/or force the semantics to be more awkward. We plan to work with the Checked C team to implement our approach in a future revision.

C. Metatheory

While designing our Coq model of CORECHKC, we also designed a model in PLT Redex. Redex [6] is a semantic engineering framework implemented in Racket, which allows for concisely specifying semantics and typing rules. We formalize the simulation theorem in this model, and then attempt to falsify it via Redex’s support for random testing. We ultimately plan to prove simulation in the Coq model.

\(^8\)The two models, in Redex and Coq, are equivalent, with the only difference being in the representation of stacks: as we saw, the Coq model uses an explicit map for representing stacks to ease the effort of theorem proving; on the other hand, the Redex model uses let bindings to simulate a stack, which removes the need to account for the stack during random generation of terms.
Turning to the simulation theorem: We first introduce notation used to specify the theorem. We use the notation $\gg$ to indicate the erasure of stack and heap—the rhs is the same as the lhs but with type annotations removed:

$$H \gg \dot{H}$$
$$\varphi \gg \dot{\varphi}$$

In addition, we write $(\varphi, H, e) \gg (\dot{\varphi}, \dot{H}, \dot{e})$ to denote $\varphi \gg \dot{\varphi}$, $H \gg \dot{H}$ and $e \gg \dot{e}$ respectively.

We use $\rightarrow^*$ to denote the transitive closure of the reduction relation of COREC. Unlike the CORECHKC, the semantics of COREC does not distinguish checked and unchecked regions.

Fig. 10 gives an overview of the simulation theorem. The simulation theorem is specified in a way that is similar to the one by Merigoux et al. [16]. An ordinary simulation property would replace the middle and bottom parts of the figure with the following:

$$(\varphi_0, H_0, e_0) \rightarrow^* (\varphi_1, H_1, e_1)$$

Instead, we relate two erased configurations using the relation $\sim$, which only requires that the two configurations will eventually reduce to the same state. We formulate our simulation theorem differently because the standard simulation theorem imposes a very strong syntactic restriction to the compilation strategy. Very often, $(\varphi_0, H_0, e_0)$ reduces to a term that is semantically equivalent to $(\varphi_1, H_1, e_1)$, but we are unable to syntactically equate the two configurations due to the extra binders generated for dynamic checks and ANF transformation. In earlier versions of the Redex model, we attempted to change the compilation rules so the configurations could match syntactically. However, the approach scaled poorly as we added additional rules. This slight relaxation on the equivalence relation between target configurations allows us to specify compilation more naturally without having to worry about syntactic constraints.

**Theorem 4 (Simulation ($\sim$)):** For CORECHKC expressions $e_0$, stacks $\varphi_0$, $\varphi_1$, and heap snapshots $H_0$, $H_1$, if $\emptyset; \emptyset; \emptyset \vdash_\text{c} e_0 \gg \dot{e}_0 : \tau_0$, and if there exists some $r_1$ such that $(\varphi_0, H_0, e_0) \rightarrow_\text{c} (\varphi_1, H_1, r_1)$, when $r_1 = e_1$ for some $e_1$ and $\emptyset; \emptyset; \emptyset \vdash_\text{c} e_1 \gg \dot{e}_1 : \tau_1$ where $\tau_1 \subseteq \tau_0$, then there exists some $\dot{\varphi}_1, \dot{H}_1, \dot{e}_1$ such that $(\varphi_0, H_0, e_0) \rightarrow^* (\dot{\varphi}, \dot{H}, \dot{e})$ and $(\dot{\varphi}_1, \dot{H}_1, \dot{e}_1) \rightarrow^* (\dot{\varphi}, \dot{H}, \dot{e})$. When $r_1 = \text{bounds}$ or $\text{null}$, we have $(\varphi_0, H_0, e_0) \rightarrow^* (\dot{\varphi}_1, \dot{H}_1, r_1)$ where $\dot{\varphi}_1 \gg \dot{\varphi}_1, \dot{H}_1 \gg \dot{H}_1$.

Fig. 10: Simulation between CORECHKC and COREC

9. Each expression can reduce multiple steps, and we test simulation between every two adjacent steps to cover a wider range of programs, particularly the ones that have a non-empty heap.

**V. RANDOM TESTING VIA THE IMPLEMENTATION**

In addition to using the CORECHKC Redex model to establish simulation of compilation (Section IV-C), we also used it to gain confidence that our model matches the Clang Checked C implementation; disagreement on outcomes signals a bug in either the model or the compiler itself. Doing so allowed us to quickly iterate on the design of the model while adding new features, and revealed several bugs in the Clang Checked C implementation.

**Generating Well Typed Terms.** For this random generation, we follow the approach of Pałka et al. [19] to generate well-typed Checked C terms by viewing the typing rules as generation rules. Suppose we have a context $\Gamma$, a mode $m$ and a type $\tau$, and we are trying to generate a well-typed expression. We can do that by reversing the process of type checking, selecting a typing rule and building up an expression in a way that satisfies the rule’s premises.

Recall the typing rule for dereferencing an array pointer, which we depicted below as G-DEFARR$^{10}$, color-coded to represent inputs and outputs of the generation process:$^{11}$

$$\text{G-DEFARR}$$

$$\Gamma; \Theta \vdash_m e : \text{ptr}^{m_a} [\beta ; \tau]_\kappa \quad m \leq m_a$$

If we selected G-DEFARR for generating an expression, the generated expression has to have the form $*e$, for some $e$, to be generated according to the rule’s premises. To satisfy the premise $\Gamma; \Theta \vdash_m e : \text{ptr}^{m_a} [\beta ; \tau]_\kappa$, we essentially need to make a recursive call to the generator, with appropriately adjusted inputs. However, the type in this judgment is not fixed yet—it contains three unknown variables: $m_a$, $\beta$, and $\kappa$—that need to be generated before making the call. Looking at the second premise informs that generation: if the input mode $m$ is u, then $m_a$ needs to be u as well; if not, it is unconstrained, just

---

$^{10}$Generator rules G-* correspond one to one with the type rules T-* in Sec. III-C.

$^{11}$This input-output marking is commonly called a mode in the literature, but we eschew this term to avoid confusion with our pointer mode annotation.
like $\beta$ and $\kappa$, and therefore all three are free to be generated at random. Thus, the recursive call to generate $e$ can now be made, and the G-DEFARR rule returns $\ast e$ as its output.

Using such generator rules, we can create a generator for random well-typed terms of a given type in a straightforward manner: find all rules whose conclusion matches the given type and then randomly choose a candidate rule to perform the generation. To ensure that this process terminates, we follow the standard practice of using “fuel” to bound the depth of the generated terms; once the fuel is exhausted, only rules without recursive premises are selected [12]. Similar methods were used for generating top level functions and struct definitions.

While using just the typing-turned-generation rules is in theory enough to generate all well-typed terms, it’s more effective in practice to try and exercise interesting patterns. As in Palka et al. [19] this can be viewed as a way of adding admissible but redundant typing rules, with the sole purpose of using them for generation. For example, below is one such rule, G-ASTR, which creates an initialized null-terminated string that is statically cast into an array with bounds $(0, 0)$.

$\text{G-ASTR}$

\[
\begin{align*}
\Gamma & \vdash m: \text{ptr}\{[(0, 0) \text{int}]_{nt}\} \\
& \vdash e = \text{let } x = e' \text{ in } (\text{init } x \text{ with } n_0, \ldots, n_{i-1}); x
\end{align*}
\]

Given some positive number $i$, numbers $n_0, \ldots, n_{i-1}$, and a fresh variable $x$ (which are arbitrarily generated), we can recursively generate a pointer $e'$ with bounds $(0, i)$, and initialize it with the generated $n_j$ using $x$ to temporarily store the pointer.

This rule is particularly useful when combined with G-I\text{fNT} since there is a much higher chance of obtaining a non-zero value when evaluating $\ast p$ in the guard of if, skewing the distribution towards programs that enter the then branch. Relying solely on the type-based rules, entering the then branch requires G-ASSIGN, and that assignment would have to appear before if, which means additional G-LET rules would need to be chosen: this combination would therefore be essentially impossible to generate in isolation.

**Generating Ill-typed Terms.** We can use generated well-typed terms to test our simulation theorem (Section IV) and test that CORECHKC and Checked C Clang agree on what is type-correct. But it is also useful to generate ill-typed terms to test that CORECHKC and Checked C Clang agree on those. However, while it is easy to generate arbitrary ill-typed terms, they would be very unlikely to trigger any inconsistencies; those are far more likely to exist on the boundary between well- and ill-typedness. Therefore, we also include generation rules modified to be slightly more permissive, which results in sometimes generating terms that are “a little” ill-typed.

**Random Testing for Language Design.** We used our Redex model and random generator to successfully guide the design of our formal model, and indeed the Clang Checked C implementation itself, which is being actively developed.

To that end, we implemented a conversion tool that converts CORECHKC into a subset of the Checked C language and ensured that model and implementation exhibit the same behavior (accept and reject the same programs and yield the same return value).

This approach constitutes an interesting twist to traditional model-based checking approaches. Usually, one checks that the implementation and model agree on all inputs of the implementation, with the goal of covering as many behaviors as possible. This is the case, for example, in Guha et al. [8], where they use real test suites to demonstrate the faithfulness of their core calculus to Javascript. Our approach and goal in this work is essentially the opposite: as the Clang Checked C implementation does not fully implement the Checked C spec, there is little hope of covering all terms that are generated by Clang Checked C. Instead, we’re looking for inconsistencies, which could be caused by bugs either in the Clang Checked C compiler or our own model.

One inconsistency we found comes from the following:

\begin{verbatim}
array_ptr<char> fun(void) : count(3) {
    array_ptr<char> x : count(3);
    x = calloc(3, sizeof(char));
    return x+3;
}

int main(void) {
    *(fun()) = 0;
    return 0;
}
\end{verbatim}

In this code, the function `fun` is supposed to return a checked array pointer of size 3. Internally, it allocates such an array, but instead of returning the pointer `x` to that array, it increments that pointer by 3. Then, the `main` function just calls `fun`, and tries to assign 0 to its result. Our model correctly rules out this program, while the Clang Checked C implementation happily accepted this out-of-bounds assignment. Interestingly, it correctly rejected programs where the array had size 1 or 2. This inconsistency has been fixed in the latest version of the compiler.

We also found the opposite kind of inconsistency—programs that the Clang Checked C implementation rejects contrary to the spec. For instance:

\begin{verbatim}
array_ptr<int> f(void) : count(5) {
    array_ptr<int> x : count(5);
    calloc<int>({5, sizeof(int)});
    return x;
}

array_ptr<int> g(void) : count(5) {
    array_ptr<int> x : count(5);
    calloc<int>({5, sizeof(int)});
    return x+3;
}

int main(void) {
    *(0 ? g() : f()) + 3;
}
\end{verbatim}

\[\text{12After minimization, this turned out to be a known issue: https://github.com/microsoft/checkedc-clang/issues/1008}\]
In this piece of code both `f` and `g` functions compute a pointer to the same index in an array of size 5 (as `f` calls `g`). The `main` function then creates a ternary expression whose branches call `f` and `g`, but the Clang Checked C implementation rejects this program, as its static analysis is not sophisticated enough to detect that both branches have the same type.

VI. RELATED WORK

Our work is most closely related to prior formalizations of C-(like) languages that aim to enforce memory safety, but it also touches on C-language formalization in general.

**Formalizing C and Low-level code.** A number of prior works have looked at formalizing the semantics of C, including CompCert [1, 13], Ellison and Rosu [5], Kang et al. [11], and Memarian et al. [14, 15]. These works also model pointers as logically coupled with either the bounds of the blocks they point to, or provenance information from which bounds can be derived. None of these is directly concerned with enforcing spatial safety, and that is reflected in the design. For example, memory itself is not be represented as a flat address space, as in our model or real machines, so memory corruption due to spatial safety violations, which Checked C’s type system aims to prevent, may not be expressible. That said, these formalizations consider much more of the C language than does CORECHKC, since they are interested in the entire language’s behavior.

**Spatially Safe C Formalizations.** Several prior works formalize C-language transformations or C-language dialects aiming to ensure spatial safety. Hathorn et al. [9] extends the formalization of Ellison and Rosu [5] to produce a semantics that detects violations of spatial safety (and other forms of undefinedness). It uses a CompCert-style memory model, but “fattens” logical pointer representations to facilitate adding side conditions similar to CORECHKC’s. Its concern is bug finding, not compiling programs to use this semantics. CCured [18] and Softbound [17] implement spatially safe semantics for normal C via program transformation. Like CORECHKC, both systems’ operational semantics annotate pointers with their bounds. CCured’s equivalent of array pointers are compiled to be “fat,” while SoftBound compiles bounds metadata to a separate hashtable, thus retaining binary compatibility at higher checking cost. Checked C uses static type information to enable bounds checks without need of pointer-attached metadata, as we show in Section IV. Neither CCured nor Softbound models null-terminated array pointers, whereas our semantics ensures that such pointers respect the zero-termination invariant, leveraging bounds widening to enhance expressiveness.

Cyclone [7, 10] is a C dialect that aims to ensure memory safety; its pointer types are similar to CCured. Cyclone’s formalization [7] focuses on the use of regions to ensure temporal safety; it does not formalize arrays or threats to spatial safety. Deputy [2, 26] is another safe-C dialect that aims to avoid fat pointers; it was an initial inspiration for Checked C’s design [4], though it provides no specific modeling for null-terminated array pointers. Deputy’s formalization [2] defines its semantics directly in terms of compilation, similar in style to what we present in Section IV. Doing so tightly couples typing, compilation, and semantics, which are treated independently in CORECHKC. Separating semantics from compilation isolates meaning from mechanism, easing understandability. Indeed, it was this separation that led us to notice the limitation with Checked C’s handling of bounds widening.

The most closely related work is the formalization of Checked C done by Ruef et al. [21]. They were the first to formalize and prove blame for a core model of Checked C, which shows that any spatial safety violation owes to invariants violated by unchecked code. Our Coq-based development (Section III) substantially extends theirs,13 re-proving the blame theorem after adding dynamically bounded array pointers with dependent types, null-terminated pointers, and dependently typed functions. They postulate that pointer meta-data can be erased, but do not show it; indeed, we found it nontrivial once null-terminated pointers were considered.

VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

This paper presented CORECHKC, a formalization of an extended core of the Checked C language which aims to provide spatial memory safety. Our formalization modeled dynamically sized and null-terminated arrays with dependently typed bounds that can additionally be widened at runtime. We prove, in Coq, the key safety property of Checked C for our formalization, blame: if a mix of checked and unchecked code gives rise to a spatial memory safety violation, then this violation originated in an unchecked part of the code. We also demonstrated how programs written in CORECHKC (whose semantics leverage fat pointers) can be compiled to COREC (which does not) while preserving their behavior. Finally, we developed a random testing framework to guide the design of our formal model by comparing it against the Checked C compiler, finding multiple inconsistencies in the process.

As future work, we are interested in designing an a way to automatically port legacy C code to Checked C. We also want to further extend our CORECHKC model to include more C behaviors, such as function pointers, with our testing framework guiding the design process.

REFERENCES


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\[13\] https://github.com/plum-umd/checkedc/tree/master/coq
APPENDIX

A. Typing Rules for Literal Pointers

One thing we elided from the main presentation is the typing of integer literals (which can also be pointers to the heap). These rules are shown in Fig. 11. The variable type rule (T-VAR) simply checks if a given variable has the defined type in \( \Gamma \); the constant rule (T-CONST) is slightly more involved. First, it ensures that the type annotation \( \tau \) does not contain any free variables. More importantly, it ensures that the literal itself is well-typed by assuming a typing relation \( \sigma \vdash n : \tau \), which is implicitly indexed by a given heap \( H \).

If the literal’s type is an integer, an unchecked pointer, or a null pointer, it is well typed, as shown by the top three rules in Fig. 11. However, if it is a checked pointer \( \text{ptr}^c \omega \), we need to ensure that what it points to in the heap is of the appropriate pointed-to type \( \omega \), and also recursively ensure that any literal pointers reachable this way are also well-typed.

This is captured by the bottom rule in the figure, which states that for every location \( n + i \) in the pointers’ range \([n, n + \text{size}(\omega)]\), where size yields the size of its argument, then the value at the location \( H(n + i) \) is also well-typed. However, as heap snapshots can contain cyclic structures (which would lead to infinite typing derivations), we use a scope \( \sigma \) to assume that the original pointer is well-typed when checking the types of what it points to. The middle rule then accesses the scope to tie the knot and keep the derivation finite, just like in Ruef et al. [21].

Type Rules for Constants and Variables:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{T-VAR} & \quad x : \tau \in \Gamma \\
& \quad \Gamma ; \Theta \vdash m \colon x : \tau \\
\text{T-CONST} & \quad FV(\tau) = \emptyset \\
& \quad \emptyset \vdash n : \tau \\
\end{align*}
\]

Rules for Checking Constant Pointers In Heap:

\[
\begin{align*}
\sigma \vdash n : \text{int} & \quad \sigma \vdash n : \text{ptr}^c \omega \\
\sigma \vdash 0 : \text{ptr}^c \omega & \quad \frac{\sigma \vdash n : \text{ptr}^c \omega}{\sigma \vdash n : \text{ptr}^c \omega} \\
\forall i \in [0, \text{size}(\omega)], \sigma \cup \{n : \text{ptr}^c \omega\} & \vdash H(n + i) \\
\sigma \vdash n : \text{ptr}^c \omega & \quad \frac{}{\sigma \vdash n : \text{ptr}^c \omega}
\end{align*}
\]

Fig. 11: Type Rules for Checking Constants/Variables

B. Other Semantic Rules

Fig. 12 shows the remaining semantic rules for CORECHKC. We explain a selected few rules in this subsection.

Rule S-VAR loads the value for \( x \) in stack \( \varphi \). Rule S-DEFARRAY dereferences an array pointer, which is similar to the Rule S-DEFARRAY in Fig. 4. The only difference is that the range of \( 0 \) is at \([n_l, n_h] \) not \([n_l, n_h] \), meaning that one cannot dereference the upper-bound position in an array. Rules DEFARRAYBOUND and DEFNTARRAYBOUND describe an error case for a dereference operation. If we are dereferencing an array/NT-array pointer and the mode is \( c \), 0 must be in the range from \( n_l \) to \( n_h \); if not, the system results in a bounds error. Obviously, the dereference of an array/NT-array pointer also experiences a null state transition if \( n \leq 0 \).

Rules S-MALLOC and S-MALLOCBOUND describe the malloc semantics. Given a valid type \( \omega_n \) that contains no free variables, alloc function returns an address pointing at the first position of an allocated space whose size is equal to the size of \( \omega_n \), and a new heap snapshot \( H' \) that marks the allocated space for the new allocation. The malloc is transitioned to the address \( n \) with the type \( \text{ptr}^c \omega_n \) and new updated heap. It is possible for malloc to transition to a bounds error if the \( \omega_n \) is an array/NT-array type \([n_l, n_h] \), and either \( n_l \neq 0 \) or \( n_h \leq 0 \).

C. Subtyping for dependent types

The subtyping relation given in Fig. 7 involves dependent bounds, i.e., bounds that may refer to variables. To decide premises \( b < b' \), we need a decision procedure that accounts for the possible values of these variables. This process considers \( \Theta \), tracked by the typing judgment, and \( \varphi \), the current stack snapshot (when performing subtyping as part of the type preservation proof). We

**Definition 5 (Inequality):**

- \( n \leq m \) if \( n \) is less than or equal to \( m \).
- \( x + n \leq x + m \) if \( n \) is less than or equal to \( m \).
- All other cases result in false.

To capture bound variables in dependent types, the Checked C subtyping relation (\( \sqsubseteq \)) is parameterized by a restricted stack snapshot \( \varphi|\rho \) and the predicate map \( \Theta \), where \( \varphi \) is a stack and \( \rho \) is a set of variables. \( \varphi|\rho \) means to restrict the domain of \( \varphi \) to the variable set \( \rho \). Clearly, we have the relation: \( \varphi|\rho \sqsubseteq \varphi \). The meaning of \( \sqsubseteq \) being parameterized by \( \varphi|\rho \) refers to that when we compare two bounds \( b < b' \), we actually do \( \varphi|\rho(b) \leq \varphi|\rho(b') \) by interpreting the variables in \( b \) and \( b' \) with possible values in \( \varphi|\rho \). Let’s define a subset relation \( \preceq \) for two restricted stack snapshot \( \varphi|\rho \) and \( \varphi'|\rho' \):  

**Definition 6 (Subset of Stack Snapshots):** Given two \( \varphi|\rho \) and \( \varphi'|\rho' \), \( \varphi|\rho \preceq \varphi'|\rho' \), iff for \( x \in \rho \) and \( y \), \( (x, y) \in \varphi|\rho \Rightarrow (x, y) \in \varphi'|\rho' \).

For every two restricted stack snapshots \( \varphi|\rho \) and \( \varphi'|\rho' \), such that \( \varphi|\rho \preceq \varphi'|\rho' \), we have the following theorem in Checked C (proved in Coq):

**Theorem 5 (Stack Snapshot Theorem):** Given two types \( \tau \) and \( \tau' \), two restricted stack snapshots \( \varphi|\rho \) and \( \varphi'|\rho' \), if \( \varphi|\rho \preceq \varphi'|\rho' \), then \( \tau \sqsubseteq \tau' \) under the parameterization of \( \varphi|\rho \), then \( \tau \sqsubseteq \tau' \) under the parameterization of \( \varphi'|\rho' \).

Clearly, for every \( \varphi|\rho \), we have \( \emptyset \preceq \varphi|\rho \). The type checking stage is a compile-time process, so \( \varphi|\rho \) is \( \emptyset \) at the type checking stage. Stack snapshots are needed for proving type preserving, as variables in bounds expressions are evaluated away.

As mentioned in the main text, \( \sqsubseteq \) is also parameterized by \( \Theta \), which provides the range of allowed values for a bound variable; thus, more \( \sqsubseteq \) relation is provable. For example, in
D. Other Type Rules

Here we show the type rules for other Checked C operations in Fig. 13.

Rule T-DEF is for dereferencing a non-array pointer. The statement \( m \leq m' \) relates the unchecked region for a term with its sub-terms. We require that if the sub-term has an unchecked region, so does the whole term. Rule T-MAC deals with malloc operations. There is a well-formedness check to require that the possible bound variables in \( \omega \) must be in the domain of \( \Gamma \) (see Fig. 15). Rule T-ADD deals with binary operations whose sub-terms are integer expressions, while rule T-IND serves the case for pointer arithmetic. For simplicity, in the Checked C formalization, we do not allow arbitrary pointer arithmetic. The only pointer arithmetic operations allowed are the forms shown in rules T-IND and T-INDASSIGN in Fig. 13. Rule T-ASSIGN is for assigning a value to a non-array pointer location. The predicate \( \tau' \subseteq \tau \) requires that the value being assigned is a subtype of the pointer type. The T-INDASSIGN rule is an extended assignment operation for handling assignments for array/NT-array pointers with pointer arithmetic. Rule T-UNCHECKED type checks unchecked blocks.

E. Struct Pointers

Checked C has struct types and struct pointers. Fig. 14 contains the syntax of struct types as well as new sub-typing relations built on the struct values. For a struct typed value, Checked C has a special operation for it,
Fig. 13: Remaining CORECHK Type Rules (extends Fig. 6)

which is \&e→f. This operation indexes the \-th position struct T item, if the expression e is evaluated to a struct pointer ptr\(m\) struct T. Rule T-STRUCT in Fig. 14 describes its typing behavior. Rules S-STRUCTCHECKED and S-STRUCTUNCHECKED describe the semantic behaviors of \&e→f on a given struct checked/unchecked pointers, while rule S-STRUCTNULL describes a checked struct null-pointer case. In our Coq/Redex formalization, we include the struct values and the operation \&e→f. We omit it in the main text due to the paper length limitation.

F. The Compilation Rules

Fig. 19 and Fig. 20 shows the syntax for COREC, the target language for compilation. We syntactically restrict the expressions to be in A-normal form because that is the type of expression our compiler produces. To allow explicit runtime checks, we include bounded and null as part of COREC expressions which, once evaluated, result in an corresponding error state. \(x \neq \hat{a}\) is a new syntactic form that modifies the stack variable x with the result of \(\hat{a}\). It is essential for bounds widening. ≤ and – are introduced to operate on bounds and decide whether we need to halt with a bounds error or widen a null-terminated string.

COREC does not include any annotations. We remove structs from COREC because we can always statically convert expressions of the form \&n : \(\tau\rightarrow f\) into \(n + n_f\), where \(n_f\) is the statically determined offset of \(f\) within the struct. We ellide the semantics of COREC because it is self-evident and mirrors the semantics CORECHK. The difference is that in COREC, only bounds and null can step into an error state. All failed dereferences and assignments would result in a stuck state and therefore we rely on the compiler to explicitly insert checks for checked pointers.

Fig. 23 and Fig. 24 shows the rules for the compilation judgment for expressions,

\[ \Gamma; \rho \vdash e \gg \hat{C}, \hat{a} \]

The judgment is presented differently from the one in Sec. IV, which was simplified for presentation purposes. First, we remove \(\Theta\) and \(m\) because these parameters are only used for checking and have no impact on compilation. Second, the judgment includes two outputs, a closure \(\hat{C}\) and an atom expression \(\hat{a}\), instead of a single COREC expression \(\hat{e}\). \(\hat{C}\) can
be intuitively understood as a partially constructed program or context. Whereas \( E \) is used for evaluation, \( C \) is used purely as a device for compilation. As an example, when compiling \((1 : \text{int}) + (2 : \text{int})\), we would first create a fresh variable \( x \), and then produce two outputs:

\[
\hat{C} = \text{let } x = 1 + 2 \text{ in } \Box
\]

To obtain the compiled expression \( \hat{c} \), we plug \( \hat{a} \) into \( \hat{C} \) using the usual notation \( \hat{C}[\hat{a}] \). We can also use \( \hat{C} \) to represent runtime checks, which usually take the form \( \text{let } x = \hat{c} \text{ in } \Box \), where \( \hat{c} \) contains the check whose evaluation must not trigger bounds or null for the program to continue (see Fig. 22 for the metafunctions that create those checks).

This unconventional output format enables us to separate the evaluation of the term and the computation that relies on the term’s evaluated result. Since effects and reduction (except for variables) happen only within closures, we can precisely control the order in which effects and evaluation happen by composing the contexts in a specific order. Given two closures \( C_1 \) and \( C_2 \), we write \( C_1[C_2] \) to denote the meta operation of plugging \( C_2 \) into \( C_1 \). We also use \( C_{nk} \) as a shorthand for \( C_a[C_b[C_c]] \). In the C-IND rule, we first evaluate the expressions that correspond to \( e_1 \) and \( e_2 \) through \( C_1 \) and \( C_2 \), and then perform a null check and an addition through \( C_n \) and \( C_b \). Finally, we dereference the result through \( C_4 \) before returning the pair \( \hat{C}_4, \hat{x}_4 \), propagating the flexibility to the compilation rule that recursively calls C-IND.

Fig. 22 shows the metafunctions that create closures representing dynamic checks. These functions first examine whether the pointer is a checked. If the pointer is unchecked, an empty closure \( \Box \) will be returned, because there is no need to perform a check. For bounds checking, there is a special case for NT-array pointers, where the bounds are retrieved from the ghost variables (found by looking up \( \rho \)) on the stack rather than using the bounds specified in the type annotation. This is how we achieve the same precise runtime behavior as CORECHKC in our compiled expressions.

Fig. 21 shows the metafunctions related to bounds widening. \( \Box \text{extend} \) takes \( \rho \), a checked NT-array pointer variable \( x \), and its bounds \((b_l, b_h)\) as inputs, and returns an extended \( \rho' \) that maps \( x \) to two fresh variables \( x_l, x_h \), together with a closure \( \hat{C} \) that initializes \( x_l \) and \( x_h \) to \( b_l \) and \( b_h \) respectively. This function is used in the C-LET rule to extend \( \rho \) before compiling the body of the let binding. The updated \( \rho' \) can be used for generating precise bounds checks, and for inserting expressions that can potentially widen the upper bounds, as seen in the \( \Box \text{widenstr} \) metafunction used in the C-STR compilation rule.
\[
\begin{align*}
x_1, x_h = \text{fresh} & \quad \rho' = \rho[x \mapsto (x_1, x_h)] \quad \hat{C} = \text{let } x_1 = b_l \text{ in let } x_h = b_h \text{ in } \Box \\
C, \rho & = \vdash_{\text{extend}} \rho, x, \text{ptr}^e \left[ (b_l, b_h) \right]_{nt} \\

x_1, x_h = \rho(x) & \quad x_w = \text{fresh} \quad \hat{C} = \text{let } x_w = \text{if } (x_h) \text{ 0 else } x_h = 1 \text{ in } \Box \\
\hat{C} & = \vdash_{\text{widen} \rho, x, \text{ptr}^e \left[ (b_l, b_h) \right]_{nt}} \\
x_1, x_h = \rho(e) & \quad x_a = \text{fresh} \quad \hat{C} = \text{let } x_a = \text{if } (\hat{a} \leq x_h) \text{ 0 else } x_h = \hat{a} \text{ in } \Box \\
\hat{C} & = \vdash_{\text{widen} \rho, e, \text{ptr}^e \left[ (b_l, b_h) \right]_{nt}}
\end{align*}
\]

Fig. 21: Metafunctions for widening

\[
\begin{align*}
x = \text{fresh} & \quad \hat{C} = \text{let } x = \text{if } (\hat{a}) \text{ 0 else null in } \Box \\
\hat{C} & = \vdash_{\text{null}} \hat{a}, e \\
\Box & = \vdash_{\text{null} \hat{a}, e, c} \\
\Box & = \vdash_{\text{bounds} \rho, e, \text{ptr}^w \left[ (b_l, b_h) \right]_{nt}, \hat{a}} \\
x_i, x_h = \rho(e) & \quad x_i, x_h, xcl, xch = \text{fresh} \quad \hat{C}_cl = \text{let } xcl = \text{if } (x_i \leq \hat{a}) \text{ 0 else bounds in } \Box \\
\hat{C}_{cl, ch} & = \vdash_{\text{bounds} \rho, e, \text{ptr}^e \left[ (b_l, b_h) \right]_{nt}, \hat{a}} \\
x_i, x_h = \rho(e) & \quad x_i, x_h, xcl, xch = \text{fresh} \quad \hat{C}_cl = \text{let } xcl = \text{if } (x_i \leq \hat{a}) \text{ 0 else bounds in } \Box \\
\hat{C}_{cl, ch} & = \vdash_{\text{bounds} \rho, e, \text{ptr}^e \left[ (b_l, b_h) \right]_{nt}, \hat{a}}
\end{align*}
\]

Fig. 22: Metafunctions for dynamic checks
Fig. 23: Compilation
C-ADD
\[ \Gamma; \rho \vdash e_1 \gg C_1, \hat{a}_1 : \text{int} \quad \Gamma; \rho \vdash e_2 \gg C_2, \hat{a}_2 : \text{int} \quad x_3 = \text{fresh} \quad \hat{C}_3 = \text{let } x_3 = \hat{a}_1 + \hat{a}_2 \text{ in } \square \]
\[ \Gamma; \rho \vdash C_3, x_3 : \text{int} \]

C-IND
\[ \Gamma; \rho \vdash e_1 \gg C_1, \hat{a}_1 : \text{ptr } [\beta \tau]_\kappa \quad \Gamma; \rho \vdash e_2 \gg C_2, \hat{a}_2 : \text{int} \quad \hat{C}_3 = \vdash \text{nnull } \hat{a}_1, m \]
\[ \hat{C}_b = \vdash \text{boundsR } \rho, e_1, \text{ptr } [\beta \tau]_\kappa, \hat{a}_2 \quad x_3, x_4 = \text{fresh} \quad \hat{C}_3 = \text{let } x_3 = \hat{a}_1 + \hat{a}_2 \text{ in } \square \quad \hat{C}_4 = \text{let } x_4 = \ast x_3 \text{ in } \square \]
\[ \Gamma; \rho \vdash \ast (e_1 + e_2) \gg \hat{C}_{1,2,n,3,4,5,4,6} : \tau \]

C-ASSIGN
\[ \hat{C}_b = \vdash \text{boundsW } \rho, e_1, \text{ptr } [\beta \tau]_\kappa, 0 \quad \Gamma; \rho \vdash e_2 \gg \hat{C}_2, \hat{a}_2 : \tau' \quad \tau' \subseteq \tau \quad x_3 = \text{fresh} \quad \hat{C}_3 = \text{let } x_3 = \ast \hat{a}_1 = \hat{a}_2 \text{ in } \square \quad \hat{C}_4 = \text{let } x_3 = \hat{a}_1 + \hat{a}_2 \text{ in } \square \quad \hat{C}_5 = \text{let } x_3 = \ast x_4 = x_3 \text{ in } \square \quad \tau' \subseteq \tau \]
\[ \Gamma; \rho \vdash \ast e_1 + e_2 \gg \hat{C}_{1,2,n,3,4,5} : \tau \]

C-ASSIGNARR
\[ \hat{C}_b = \vdash \text{boundsW } \rho, e_1, \text{ptr } [\beta \tau]_\kappa, 0 \quad \Gamma; \rho \vdash e_2 \gg \hat{C}_2, \hat{a}_2 : \tau' \quad \tau' \subseteq \tau \quad x_3 = \text{fresh} \quad \hat{C}_3 = \text{let } x_3 = \ast \hat{a}_1 = \hat{a}_2 \text{ in } \square \quad \hat{C}_4 = \text{let } x_3 = \hat{a}_1 + \hat{a}_2 \text{ in } \square \quad \hat{C}_5 = \text{let } x_3 = \ast x_4 = x_3 \text{ in } \square \quad \tau' \subseteq \tau \]
\[ \Gamma; \rho \vdash \ast (e_1 + e_2) \gg \hat{C}_{1,2,n,3,4,5,6,7} : \tau \]

C-STRUCT
\[ D(T) = \tau_0 f_0 \ldots ; \tau_j f_\ldots \quad \hat{C}_n = \vdash \text{nnull } \hat{a}_1, m \quad x_2 = \text{fresh} \quad \hat{C}_2 = \text{let } x_2 = \hat{a}_1 + j \text{ in } \square \]
\[ \Gamma; \rho \vdash e_1 \gg \hat{C}_2, x_2 : \text{ptr } \tau_f \]

C-UNCHECKED
\[ \Gamma; \rho \vdash \text{unchecked } e \gg \hat{C}, \hat{a} : \tau \]

Fig. 24: Compilation (continued)